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Abstract
An evaluation of the Catholic Relief Services’ (CRS) eight-step clustering approach to agroenterprise develop-
ment was a key focus of the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) – Philippine 
Council for Agriculture, Aquatic and Natural Resources Research and Development (PCAARRD) horticulture 
project on ‘Enhancing the profitability of selected vegetable value chains in the southern Philippines’. The 
CRS approach encourages farmers to form small, collaborative marketing groups (clusters) and to facilitate 
the sustainable development of these clusters. The research, which used participative action learning and 
action research processes, identified that an enhanced clustering approach should incorporate processes that 
overcome issues such as: input financing arrangements to replace loans from informal moneylenders and 
traders; risks associated with production failures and pest and disease problems; maintaining relationships 
with buyers; and building group resilience and independence so that donor agencies have an exit strategy. The 
research findings suggest that to enhance the sustainability of the clusters the CRS eight-step process should 
be applied to three phases: (i) establishment, (ii) building resilience and (iii) implementing an exit strategy.
Introduction
An integral part of the Australian Centre for Intern-
ational Agricultural Research (ACIAR) Project 
HORT/2007/066 Component 4, ‘Analysis of selected 
value chains in the southern Philippines’, was to ana-
lyse the performance of the Catholic Relief Services’ 
(CRS) eight-step clustering approach to agroen-
terprise development, to ascertain its potential for 
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facilitating the development of collaborative market-
ing groups (clusters) and to suggest improvements to 
the process. Initially, CRS was to facilitate the cluster 
marketing groups, and the role of the University of the 
Philippines Mindanao (UPMin) and Curtin University 
(Western Australia) was to evaluate their effective-
ness. In the wake of the global financial crisis, a 
lack of external funds forced CRS to re-evaluate its 
development activities in the Philippines, particularly 
agriculture and, more specifically, this project. Unable 
to find a suitable agency to undertake the role of CRS, 
the University of the Philippines Strategic Research 
and Management Foundation (UPSTREAM) assumed 
the role of facilitating the development of the cluster 
marketing groups using the CRS process.
The CRS clustering approach to 
agroenterprise development
The CRS clustering approach to agroenterprise 
development is referred to as the ‘eight-step cluster-
ing approach’ (CRS-Philippines 2007) (Figure 1). 
It begins by identifying the project site, building 
partnerships with farmers and other stakeholders, 
such as local businesses, local government and non-
government organisations (NGOs), forming a working 
group and providing a project and cluster orientation 
to smallholder farmers. Step 2 is a participatory pro-
cess in which the farmers identify the community’s 
resources, products, and production and marketing 
practices during basic marketing training. The group 
then decides what product or products will be the 
focus of their activities. Step 3 involves training farm-
ers to undertake a market chain study and to conduct 
market visits in which they develop an understanding 
of the chains for their selected products and negotiate 
trading terms with potential buyers.
Step 4 is the cluster formation phase, in which inter-
ested farmers form the cluster, select leaders and settle 
on a basic cluster agreement and objectives. Step 5, or 
cluster plan formulation, involves the development of 
a planting and harvest calendar for the products of the 
cluster and deciding on the test-marketing plan. The 
test-marketing activities in Step 6 involve at least four 
trial product deliveries. After each delivery, cluster 
members hold meetings to assess performance and 
adjust the plan to enable improvements. Once the 
group and facilitators judge the test markets success-
ful, Step 7 follows, which involves planning and con-
ducting a scaling up process. Scaling up involves pro-
ducing more products or additional products to supply 
existing markets or more diversified markets. Cluster 
members and facilitators appraise readiness for scaling 
up against criteria that assess cluster willingness, level 
of product supply, market performance, management 
performance and their financial needs. The final step 
of cluster strengthening involves undertaking activities 
Figure 1. Eight-step process of the clustering approach to agroenterprise 





















that expand cluster capacity and networks with other 
clusters and businesses. The objective is to improve 
cluster maturity.
While this process has been extensively employed 
in facilitating the development of clusters, the evi-
dence to date suggests that very few of these cluster 
marketing groups have survived once funding has 
been withdrawn. Murray-Prior (2007) suggests that 
collaborative marketing groups will survive only 
where they offer some comparative advantage. In 
other instances, it is apparent that many NGOs are 
reluctant to let their more successful groups go, for 
future funding is contingent upon their ability to dem-
onstrate success. Inadvertently, this may often result 
in the cluster becoming dependent upon the NGO. 
With limited budgets, if the clustering process is to be 
replicable, there must be a process by which formal 
linkages with the more mature groups can be severed, 
to enable them, with minimum intervention, to make 
their own decisions and to become self-sustaining. In 
turn, that enables resources to be redirected towards 
the formation of new cluster groups, greatly increas-
ing the reach and the impact of the project.
This paper explores some suggested improvements 
to the CRS eight-step plan for agroenterprise develop-
ment that will lead to more sustainable and successful 
cluster marketing groups.
Methodology
The methodology used to investigate the applica-
tion of the CRS clustering approach involves an 
integrated participatory action learning and action 
research process with over 29 cluster market-
ing groups (CMGs) in Mindanao, the southern 
Philippines. The UPMin, through the UPSTREAM 
Foundation, facilitated the establishment of several 
CMGs in Davao, Bukidnon and South Cotabato 
using the CRS eight-step process. At the same 
time, research officers from UPMin were involved 
in an action research process that documented each 
cluster group’s activities and investigated issues as 
they arose (Figure 2). Surveys were conducted of 
farm household resources, production activities and 
the relationships among farmers, wholesalers and 
traders, farmers and the cluster, clusters and trad-
ers, and wholesalers and institutional markets. Case 
study reports were prepared for each cluster and 
on selected farmers within the clusters. Findings 
from these investigations, discussions between the 
researchers and field officers, and evidence from 
the literature and experiences of the researchers, 
field officers and farmers, were used to identify 
and evaluate changes to the clustering process and 
activities.



























Because of the quantity of data involved in this 
action research/action learning study, which occurred 
over 4 years with 29 cluster groups, it is not possible 
to present the results supporting the discussions. 
Therefore, the paper summarises data, discussions 
and conclusions presented in previous papers 
published by the research team. It also follows the 
qualitative research approach in presenting the results 
and discussion together, which is the norm for action 
research.
Issues to be addressed by an 
enhanced clustering process
This combined participative action learning and 
action research process identified the need for an 
enhanced clustering process to incorporate processes 
that would overcome some of the major issues such 
as: input financing arrangements to replace loans 
from informal moneylenders and traders; the risks 
associated with production failures; maintaining rela-
tionships with buyers; and building group resilience 
and independence so that donor agencies have an exit 
strategy.
What to do about the input financing 
problem
Smallholder farmers in the Philippines and 
elsewhere have limited or no access to the formal 
lending sector. Thus, they have to rely on informal 
moneylenders, including local traders, landlords, 
commodity wholesalers and other village moneylend-
ers (Robinson 2001; Llanto 2007). These loans are 
often at rates well above those charged by commer-
cial microfinance institutions because such markets 
sometimes have characteristics of monopolistic 
competition (Robinson 2001). When smallholder 
farmers market their produce through a CMG, such 
as those created using the CRS clustering process, 
these arrangements often bypass the traditional 
marketing system. Consequently, the farmers may be 
unable to access loans from local traders and com-
modity wholesalers. These lenders often lend money 
for inputs in the expectation that they will be able to 
buy the product at prices that are advantageous to 
them. They may also threaten smallholders with not 
lending money or refusing to buy their product if they 
sell through a cluster. This appears to be a common 
occurrence (Llanto 2007).
Llanto (2007) and Campaigne and Rausch (2010) 
suggest that lending to farmers who are connected 
to an integrated supply chain is more feasible. 
Some of the cluster groups from Bukidnon and 
South Cotabato have accessed finance through 
microfinance institutions, partly because they were 
organised groups. However, their outcomes have 
been mixed (Axalan et al. 2010; Real et al. 2010). 
When production fails due to weather or disease 
problems, farmers who have formal loans from 
microfinance institutions face additional burdens, 
which can affect both the viability of the cluster and 
its marketing arrangements. In Bukidnon, squash, 
sweet pepper and bitter gourd clusters were unable to 
meet their contractual obligations due to disease- and 
weather -elated problems (Real et al. 2010). Since the 
microfinance institution provided the loans because 
the farmers were members of a CMG, some clusters 
had farmers who withdrew because they expected 
that they would be liable to repay the loans of other 
cluster members. On the other hand, members of a 
sweet pepper cluster in South Cotabato who received 
loans from a microfinance institution had fewer 
problems, partly because they did not have the same 
level of production failures, but also because of the 
way in which their loans were structured (Axalan et 
al. 2010). Other clusters in the Davao City area do 
not have access to microfinance and must therefore 
self-finance or obtain some funding from informal 
moneylenders.
In light of the literature on microf inance, 
some lessons can be drawn from these examples. 
Microfinance loans can increase the risk to farmers 
because they lead to greater investment in inputs, 
which the microfinance institution may not recover 
if production problems occur or if market prices are 
inordinately low. Often farmers involved in new 
cluster marketing groups are involved in learning 
about and implementing many new and interrelated 
behaviours. Adopting new behaviours and crops is 
inherently risky. In this case, farmers are adopting 
new marketing arrangements, often growing new or 
expanded areas of crops, and are learning to cooper-
ate to produce, market and deliver their crop to a 
focal buyer at some particular time.
If farmers in the early stages of clustering are 
provided with loans, the combination of these risks 
can leave farmers and clusters in a perilous financial 
position, as happened to the clusters in Bukidnon. 
In one case, the loan was linked to a particular crop 
and marketing arrangement (Real et al. 2010). The 
microfinance institution lent the money on the expec-
tation that the crop would be sold through a particular 
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agent who would deduct loan repayments and pay the 
farmers the remaining money. When the group could 
not meet the quantity and quality requirement due 
to a viral infection, the agent rejected the clusters’ 
product and hence repayments were not made. Since 
the repayments were linked to a particular crop and 
repayment arrangement, some farmers did not feel 
obligated to repay the loan.
Some of the loans made to clusters in Bukidnon 
were based on overoptimistic assumptions about 
yields and prices (Real et al. 2010). Since farmers are 
learning and adopting many new skills and behaviours 
in the early stages of clustering, the likelihood of crop 
failure is high. Vegetable prices in the Philippines are 
extremely volatile because of seasonal variations 
in production, with the frequency and potency of 
typhoons (Batt et al. 2011) adding an additional com-
plication. Budgeting for loans must be conservative to 
allow for the high level of production and price risk, 
and to decrease the risk of over indebtedness.
Furthermore, such loans should be made only for 
the purchase of physical inputs such as seed, ferti-
liser and pesticides. In Bukidnon particularly, it was 
evident that the value of the loan extended was much 
greater than the crop needs, which resulted in funds 
being redirected towards the purchase of household 
goods. Ideally, farmers should finance part of the 
crop from their own resources. Hermes and Lensink 
(2007) suggest that credit rationing can increase the 
likelihood of loan repayment, which is consistent 
with this view. Additionally, there is some evidence 
that loans are necessary only for crops that are more 
expensive to grow and not for all crops, at least in 
the initial trial stages. As farmers gain experience 
with crops and cluster marketing, and as the clusters 
seek to expand production and scale up, loans may 
become more necessary.
A comparison of the lending strategies followed 
by microfinance institutions in Bukidnon and South 
Cotabato and their successes and failures supports 
some of the principles underlying the Grameen 
Bank and the Association for Social Advancement 
(Llanto 2007). These include compulsory savings or 
capital build-up, progressively larger loans based on 
demonstrated competence, and financial education 
for loan recipients in budgeting, saving and managing 
debt (Llanto 2007; Cohen 2010).
Finally, donor agencies need to be careful when 
promoting and supporting loans to cluster marketing 
groups, because the action can lead to the impres-
sion that the loans are a gift. Farmers are used to 
charitable institutions providing gifts, and even where 
the loan is provided by a microfinance institution, if it 
is linked to the support that a donor agency provides 
for the cluster marketing group, it can be perceived 
as a handout. Experience with the loans made to 
some of the farmers in Bukidnon suggests this was 
a contributing factor to problems associated with 
repayment by some farmers.
Risks associated with production failures
Vegetable farming in the Philippines can be a risky 
business, with production quantity and quality varying 
widely due to climatic conditions and pest and disease 
outbreaks (Batt et al. 2011). Dry periods can lead to 
poor crop emergence and growth, while wet periods 
can dramatically affect seedling survival, flowering, 
product quality and yield. Wet weather also intensifies 
fungal diseases, which can increase costs of control 
and severely reduce yields. Similarly, poor seed selec-
tion results in disease outbreaks (as occurred for the 
bitter gourd cluster), while pest and disease outbreaks 
can occur as a result of climatic conditions, poor rota-
tions or poor crop hygiene. These variations in yield 
and quality not only reduce farmers’ returns, but also 
make it more difficult for clusters to be consistent 
suppliers to institutional markets.
One strategy adopted by farmers to manage the 
risk is to adopt lower-input production systems that 
require lower financial outlays and reduce yield vari-
ability. Many clusters are in relatively remote areas, 
so imported fertilisers and pesticides are expensive 
and difficult to obtain. Accordingly, farmers have 
been investigating the use of organic and ‘natural 
farming’ (Jensen et al. 2006) systems. These systems 
use local inputs, such as organic fertilisers, composts 
and homemade pesticides. Further investigation is 
needed to see what effects these systems have on 
levels and variability of yield and quality.
Another strategy is for the cluster to commit only 
a portion of its expected yield to the focal buyer, 
particularly if this is an institutional buyer who 
wants consistent supply. A common figure is 60% of 
a conservative estimate of yield, although this varies 
depending on the crop and the number of buyers. 
This strategy has additional advantages, in that farm-
ers are then free to sell their surplus product to other 
buyers, particularly if there is a spike in prices. They 
can also maintain their relationships with traditional 
buyers who provide other services such as credit. It 
also spreads their risk if one of their buyers defaults 
or refuses to accept product for whatever reason.
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Maintaining relationships with buyers
Modern value chains, because they require consist-
ent quantity and quality of supply and processes for 
ensuring food safety, have generally developed in 
advanced economies and are therefore more suited to 
medium- to large-scale farmers. Smallholder farmers 
in the Philippines have little understanding of these 
markets because they have traditionally dealt only 
with local traders, and rarely visit the wet markets 
where most of their product is sold. The clustering 
process tries to overcome this deficiency by training 
farmers to conduct their own market chain stud-
ies, including talking to buyers at different stages 
of the chain and in different markets. Farmers are 
also taught negotiating skills, which improves their 
confidence and ability to negotiate prices, volume 
and quality with institutional and other buyers. 
Nevertheless, smallholder farmers generally take 
some time to develop their knowledge of market 
operations and requirements, and this can create mis-
understandings and conflict between the cluster and 
buyers—especially institutional buyers. Conversely, 
institutional buyers often come from cities and 
have little understanding of the constraints faced by 
smallholder farmers, which exacerbates misunder-
standings and conflicts between the two groups. This 
combination has led to numerous breakdowns in the 
relationship between buyers and clusters.
One strategy to reduce the effect of this issue is the 
conduct of series of test-marketing activities (CRS 
Step 6). After each trial, the cluster evaluates the 
performance of the trial product deliveries in terms 
of the quantity and quality of the product that was 
delivered versus what was planned. However, there 
can still be misunderstandings between the cluster 
and its buyer, and sometimes the donor agency has 
to facilitate a discussion about the causes of the 
misunderstanding. Sometimes the problem is with 
the farmers, but equally the problem can be with the 
buyer who can try to take advantage of the farmers, 
possibly because that is what they have been used 
to doing.
This is a learning process for both sides and it 
appears that in some cases it requires a couple of 
years, including periods where the cluster sells to 
other buyers, before a sustainable relationship is 
achieved. In other situations, a sustainable relationship 
may not be possible due to a whole range of reasons. 
The donor agency that is facilitating this process 
needs to have patience and to act as an honest broker 
by not taking sides, and by attempting to identify the 
root causes of the problem. It is important for farmers 
to be involved in discussions and negotiations with the 
institutional buyers, as this is the only way in which 
understanding and mutual respect can be gained and 
sustained. Supermarket buyers of vegetables from 
Davao and Bukidnon clusters have been taken to the 
smallholder farms where the vegetables they are buy-
ing are grown, to give them an appreciation of some 
of the difficulties faced by the farmers in getting a 
quality product to market.
Enhancements to the CRS 
clustering process
Cooperatives and cooperative marketing arrange-
ments have a poor record in the Philippines. Many 
of these cooperatives were set up for political reasons 
such as agricultural development, pacification of 
revolutionary activities and distribution of subsidised 
inputs. Most cooperatives failed when government 
removed institutional supports. Outside support 
can enhance the chances of success of smallholder 
cooperatives (Murray-Prior 2007), but it can encour-
age dependency, which means the cooperatives are 
not sustainable once external support is withdrawn 
(Shigetomi 2006). If cluster marketing is to be a 
successful alternative, processes are required that 
develop resilience in the groups so that they can 
survive with minimal external support. This also 
implies building in an exit strategy as a component 
of the clustering approach.
There are two key factors that are important to 
the success of cluster marketing arrangements: 1. a 
comparative advantage over alternative marketing 
structures; and 2. trust in cluster management and 
between cluster members (Murray-Prior 2007). The 
clustering approach addresses the first of these issues 
through its focus on developing a marketing plan and 
its test-marketing activities. The group is unlikely to 
form unless the cluster farmers see a comparative 
advantage for cluster marketing over their exist-
ing marketing arrangements. The second issue is 
addressed in a number of ways (CRS-Philippines 
2007). First, the process is participatory and transpar-
ent, and considerable effort is devoted to activities that 
involve cluster members, market chain investigations, 
development of the production plans, and keeping 
records on deliveries and payments that are accessible 
to all members. Members develop a cluster agree-
ment, develop cluster enterprise plans and business 
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policies and systems, and review test-marketing 
activities. Second, clusters conduct regular meetings, 
and members elect the leadership team. Third, clusters 
are normally restricted to 15 or fewer members so that 
trust can be maintained through group pressure. As 
well, the clusters and their leaders receive training in 
group processes and leadership. Evidence from the 
trust measures collected by the research officers (e.g. 
Montiflor et al. 2010) indicate that cluster members 
currently have high levels of trust in their cluster.
While comparative advantage and trust are essen-
tial to the successful operations of CMGs they are not 
sufficient; nor do they guarantee success in the long 
run. A three-phase clustering framework is proposed 
that builds on and enhances the processes outlined 
in the CRS eight-step process. It incorporates three 
phases: Phase 1—Establishment; Phase 2—Building 
resilience; and Phase 3—Implement an exit strategy 
(Figure 3). Each of these phases is a type of participa-
tory action learning cycle and contains a series of 
steps that may be repeated depending on the maturity 
of the group.
Phase 1—Establishment
The establishment phase follows the first six steps 
of the CRS process (CRS–Philippines 2007) with 
minor modifications and takes 1–2 years. In step 1 
(site selection, partnership building and formation of 
working group), greater emphasis needs to be put on 
investigating input-financing arrangements, both the 
existing informal lending arrangements and potential 
microfinance lenders if farmers are not involved with 
them already. More orientation is required on saving, 
loans and financing alternatives in addition to the 
orientation on marketing that is currently provided.
In step 2 (product supply assessment and product 
selection), potential crops and products should be 
ranked but not selected. Product selection would then 
be re-evaluated following the market research (CRS 
step 3). This step should be expanded to include an 
investigation of input requirements for particular 
crops selected following the market research, poten-
tial sources and costs of those inputs, and the ability 
of farmers to finance these inputs. Financial institu-
tions may help with the latter.
In step 4 (cluster formation), the eight-step process 
of orientation on marketing basics and clustering 
needs to be broadened to include production issues, 
sources of inputs and the financial implications of 
particular crops. Step 5 (cluster plan formulation) 
would then proceed according to the eight-step 
process. The test-marketing activities (CRS step 6) 
would go through a number of stages including: 
(i) assessment of cluster commitment and capability 
of members; (ii) identification of information and 
training needs and conduct of trainings to overcome 
deficiencies; (iii) evaluation of buyers and establish-
ment of a good working relationship; and (iv) refine-
ment of agroenterprise plans.
Phase 2—Building resilience
The focus of Phase 2 is essentially cluster strength-
ening and capacity building—an expansion of the 
CRS step 8, known as cluster strengthening. Groups 
Figure 3. Three phases in enhanced clustering process
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will often go through periods of decline in activity, 
often caused by production or marketing problems. 
A lack of capacity and immaturity in the cluster can 
sometimes cause marketing problems, but buyers 
not paying or not complying with their agreements 
can also be a cause. Problems like these can cause 
the cluster to collapse, but if the donor agency is 
able to support the cluster in developing strategies 
to deal with these problems, the clusters develop 
confidence in their own abilities and are in a better 
position to deal with future issues without assistance. 
One example of this from our research occurred with 
the Ned cluster, which delivered product to a buyer 
who did not pay them. The group negotiated with 
their microfinance agency to obtain a loan and then 
investigated and found new markets for their products 
(Axalan et al. 2010). Their ability to overcome this 
problem led to greater commitment.
Kaganzai et al. (2009) argue that this ‘repair and 
maintenance’ support from donor agencies may be 
necessary in the scaling-up phase of collaborative 
marketing groups. In fact, one or two of these difficult 
periods can be part of the process of developing resil-
ience. Clusters have overcome production problems 
by establishing links with seed companies to provide 
better quality seed and changed production practices 
with the assistance of local government advisers. 
Clusters have overcome marketing problems by 
identifying new buyers and markets and subsequently 
diversified their markets. In this phase, the role of 
the donor agency is to provide assistance when the 
cluster is struggling, to help enhance cluster networks 
and to build cluster capacity. They provide less direct 
assistance, and the group is encouraged to draw on 
its own resources. The steps in this phase include: 
(i) revisiting the product supply assessment step and 
reassessing training support needs; (ii) undertaking a 
further market chain study with a view to reassessing 
the cluster’s performance in meeting market needs, 
identifying additional markets and selecting focal 
market chains; (iii) review cluster membership and 
structure; (iv) identifying information, training and 
support needs which are addressed through training 
and capacity-building activities; (v) formulating 
cluster and operational plans; and (vi) conducting 
and reviewing marketing activities.
Phase 3—Implementing an exit strategy
Sustainability of cluster marketing arrangements 
is problematic, as many such groups have failed after 
the donor agency withdraws. Some reasons for this 
problem include: donor agencies taking control of 
marketing and hence replacing the market inter-
mediary; donor agencies providing too many gifts 
and creating a ‘handout mentality’; competition 
between donor agencies; donor agencies focusing 
on ‘favourite’ groups that have a ‘reputation’ for 
success; and the failure of donor agencies to develop 
exit strategies. Markelova and Mwangi (2010) call for 
donor agencies to develop viable exit strategies from 
the onset of their project, so as to lessen dependency 
issues. The CRS clustering process already includes 
criteria for assessing cluster maturity (see CRS–
Philippines 2007, p. 140), so the focus here is on how 
to incorporate these into a process for implementing 
an exit strategy for the donor agency. The specific 
steps in this phase could include: (i) a workshop to 
assess maturity for graduation or exit of the donor 
agency; (ii) training in business planning and the 
development of business plans; (iii) strengthening 
links with support institutions; (iv) formulating a 
business plan for the cluster’s afterlife; (v) participa-
tory evaluation of the clustering process, the donor 
agency involvement in the process and the donor 
agency performance; and (iv) organising a graduation 
activity. It must be made clear to the farmers from the 
beginning of the establishment phase that the donor 
agency will provide support for only a finite period 
and that the CMG will need to build its resilience and 
become self-sustaining. Identifying this phase in the 
process helps to emphasise this reality to the cluster 
members and to the donor agency staff.
Conclusions
Development activities of many donor agencies fail 
because they do not focus on an exit strategy from 
the initial planning stages. This paper outlines an 
expansion of the CRS eight-step plan for agroen-
terprise development to cover each of three phases: 
(i) establishment; (ii) building resilience; and (iii) 
implementing an exit strategy, so that the focus 
will be on the cluster marketing group becoming 
self-sustaining. It also addresses access to finance 
from the formal lending sector, but this can increase 
risks for farmers, so the donor agency must ensure 
that farmers do not get the perception that the loans 
are a gift. Building long-term relationships between 
cluster marketing groups and institutional buyers in 
the Philippines is a difficult process. A donor agency 
will have to invest considerable time and effort in 
facilitating this process and organising activities 
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that build capacity and relationships between the 
smallholder farmers, institutional buyers and other 
government and non-government institutions, so that 
clusters can undertake these activities after the donor 
agency exits.
This is the first time the CRS eight-step plan has 
been investigated scientifically. The three-phase 
process also has the potential to become a process 
used widely in the Philippines and elsewhere, as 
a mechanism to facilitate rural development and 
improve smallholder farmer incomes. However, the 
sustainability of clusters under this process and under 
the existing CRS eight-step plan, and the factors that 
will increase long-term sustainability still need to be 
investigated.
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